A broad wave of defaults from recent high-DTI buyers looks very unlikely, and the reasons are structural. - Underwriting stayed strict. Loans written in a higher-rate stretch still had to pass full documentation and automated underwriting, with high average credit scores. The borrowers who got approved genuinely qualified under current rules. - Equity changes everything. Most existing homeowners hold substantial equity, and an owner with real equity who hits trouble can sell rather than default. Underwater borrowers without that option are what turned past downturns into foreclosure crises. A fair nuance: loans made when rates are elevated and equity cushions are thinner do carry somewhat higher statistical default risk per loan than loans made in a cheap-rate, fast-appreciation window. But somewhat higher risk on individual loans is a long way from systemic stress across the market, and we do not see an appreciable level of that building in the recent vintage. The real risk is always individual. A specific buyer who stretched to the edge of their ratios with no reserves is exposed if income drops, regardless of what the aggregate numbers say. That is why we care more about your cushion after closing than about the maximum ratio you could technically hit.